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INTRODUCTION 
Due to structural, procedural, and practical considerations, the 
government contracts portion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit’s docket is relatively modest. The Circuit typically issues 
fewer than twenty precedential opinions each year in government 
contracts cases.1 
The court’s 2017 docket was consistent with its previous dockets in 
this regard, with only about ten such decisions.  Among these, seven 
cases can be fairly characterized as being principally about the merits, 
while the other three are noteworthy for their jurisdictional rulings. 
Because the canon of controlling case law grows slowly, each 
individual case holds the potential to exert significant influence on the 
decision making of several adjudicative bodies over which the Federal 
Circuit effectively has the last word.  These lower tribunals include the 
Court of Federal Claims (COFC), the Government Accountability 
Office Bid Protest Unit, the Boards of Contract Appeals, and several 
quasi-judicial forums of administrative agencies.  This year the court 
added several useful opinions to the canon. 
At the beginning of each Part below, we briefly discuss the reasons 
why all but a vanishingly few government contracts cases are resolved 
before they reach the Federal Circuit. 
I. CONTRACTOR CLAIMS CASES 
Contractor claims cases often take several years to reach the Federal 
Circuit and typically are resolved long before the court determines the 
matter.  Instead of being addressed through a judicial proceeding, 
most disagreements that arise in the course of contract performance 
are addressed on an ongoing basis through administrative procedures, 
such as change orders and requests for equitable adjustment.  These 
contract actions will be reflected in contract modifications, which may 
or may not include changes to the price or estimated costs.  In many 
cases, the required computation of damages—the “sum certain” for 
certified claims under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA)—cannot be 
made until long after the cause of the damages occurred. 
                                               
 1. Kathleen Hsu, 2015 Survey of Government Contract Cases Before the Federal Circuit, 
65 AM. U. L. REV. 933 (2016); Kyle R. Jefcoat, The Federal Circuit’s 2014 Government 
Contract Decisions, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 807 (2015). 
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The relatively long six-year limitations period under the CDA allows 
ample time for the parties to work out their differences.  In many cases, 
contractors prefer not to submit certified claims early in the 
performance period for fear of poisoning the relationship between the 
parties. Add in the time needed to conduct discovery and a trial at 
either a Board of Contract Appeals or the COFC and it is little wonder 
that the five cases discussed below took an average of about ten years 
from the events in question to reach a Federal Circuit opinion. 
A. Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army 
Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army2 concerned the specificity 
with which a certified claim to the contracting officer must be stated in 
order to appeal an adverse contracting officer’s final decision (“COFD”).3  
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit determined that the certified claim must 
not only state the government action that caused the damages in a sum 
certain,4 but the claimant must also set forth the legal theory that entitles 
it to recover on its claim.5  Additionally, in its jurisdictional analysis, the 
Federal Circuit stated a rather sweeping condemnation of the use of 
legislative history in statutory interpretation, which practitioners are 
sure to cite often, particularly when they believe a plain reading of the 
statutory text favors the result they advocate.6 
1. Background 
Completed in 1952, Kentucky’s Wolf Creek Dam created Lake 
Cumberland, the largest man-made lake east of the Mississippi River.7  
For nearly fifty years, Lee’s Ford Dock has operated a marina on Lake 
Cumberland under a series of leases with the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (“the Corps”).8  The 2001 lease at issue in this case was for 
twenty-five years (with a lessee option to extend for another twenty-five-
                                               
 2. 865 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 3. Id. at 1366. 
 4. The Federal Acquisition Regulations defines a “claim” to mean “a written 
demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of 
right, the payment of money in a sum certain.”  FAR § 2.101 (2017). 
 5. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 6. Id. at 1367 (“We therefore decline to restrict the scope of the CDA to a 
nonlimiting example drawn from the legislative history when the statute uses 
unambiguously broader language.”). 
 7. Ian Urbina & Bob Driehaus, Fears for a Dam’s Safety Put Tourist Area on Edge, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 4, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/04dam.html. 
 8. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1363. 
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year term) and comprised 130 acres of water and 36 acres of land.9  One 
condition of the lease allowed the Corps to “manipulate the level of the 
lake . . . in any manner whatsoever” and stated that Lee’s Ford Dock “shall 
have no claim for damages on account” of such manipulations.10 
Following a series of structural reviews of the Wolf Creek Dam, in 
2007, the Corps deemed it to be in such a deteriorated condition that 
the water level of Lake Cumberland would have to be lowered to reduce 
the stress on the dam.11  It would be seven years before the dam was 
repaired and the lake’s water level returned to its previous elevation.12  
Although the particulars are not stated in the Federal Circuit’s opinion, 
it is fair to surmise that for the better part of a decade, much of the 130 
acres of water surrounding Lee’s Ford Dock was actually mud.13 
In its certified claim to the Corps, Lee’s Ford Dock alleged that the 
unprecedented lowering of Lake Cumberland’s water elevation caused 
it to incur at least $4,000,000 in damages.14  In the claim, Lee’s Ford 
Dock asserted that at the time the parties entered into the lease they 
“could not have envisioned” that the water elevation would drop for 
such a long period of time.15  Lee’s Ford Dock argued that the purpose 
of the lease—to operate a marina—had been frustrated by the lowering 
of the lake level and that the Corps should compensate Lee’s Ford Dock 
for its loss.16  The contracting officer denied the claim in its entirety. 
As presented to the Corps, Lee’s Ford Dock’s claim for recovery 
under a mutual mistake theory had several legal infirmities.17  Among 
them, mutual mistakes of fact must rest on present factual errors, not 
erroneous predictions of the conditions that may arise in the future.18  
Moreover, even if Lee’s Ford Dock had proven that there were mutual 
mistakes, the remedy typically would be to set the contract aside, not to 
                                               
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1363–64. 
 12. Id. at 1364. 
 13. See Urbina & Driehaus, supra note 7 (referring to Lake Cumberland’s 
residents’ jesting boasts that they “have some of the best ‘mud front’ property in the 
country” and noting that forty of the lake’s forty-eight boat ramps were dry). 
 14. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1364. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(defining mutual mistake of fact as “[w]here there has been a mutual mistake of material 
fact, resulting in a contract which does not faithfully embody the parties’ actual intent”). 
 18. Dairyland Power Coop. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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award damages.19  This is especially so because the claimant did not 
appear to have shown that the government would have accepted the risk 
had the parties known of the mutual mistake of fact.20   And even if the 
contract were reformed, the reformation would be to the contract terms 
themselves, like an adjustment to the lease rate, and would not include a 
payment from the government to the contractor for lost revenue.21 
2. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals’s decision 
Deciding it needed a better theory than mutual mistake on appeal 
to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), Lee’s Ford 
Dock cast its lot with a superior knowledge claim.22  In its one-count 
breach of contract complaint, Lee’s Ford Dock alleged that the Corps’s 
inspections of the Wolf Creek Dam conducted in the 1990s—and not 
disclosed to Lee’s Ford Dock—revealed the deteriorating condition of 
the dam and indicated that Lake Cumberland would have to be drawn 
down to repair the dam during the twenty-five-year lease term.23 
In July 2014, the ASBCA granted the Corps’s motion to dismiss on 
the grounds that Lee’s Ford Dock had not submitted the superior 
knowledge claim to the Corps, as required by 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(1).24  
This decision put the contractor in jeopardy of being time-barred 
under the CDA’s six-year statute of limitations.25  That is, following the 
ASBCA’s dismissal, Lee’s Ford Dock reasonably was leery of returning 
to the Corps in late 2014 for a new COFD that necessarily was premised 
on the drawing down of Lake Cumberland seven years prior. 
Rather than confront the statute of limitations problem, Lee’s Ford 
Dock tried the tack of squeezing a colorable legal theory within the 
                                               
 19. Sargent v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (per curiam). 
 20. Roseburg Lumber Co. v. Madigan, 978 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 21. Id. at 665–66. 
 22. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 932 F.2d 947, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
To show a breach under the superior knowledge doctrine, a contractor claiming 
a breach by non-disclosure must produce specific evidence that it (1) 
undert[ook] to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects 
performance costs or direction, (2) the government was aware the contractor 
had no knowledge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any 
contract specification supplied misled the contractor, or did not put it on notice 
to inquire, and (4) the government failed to provide the relevant information. 
Id. 
 23. Lee’s Ford Dock, Inc. v. Sec’y of the Army, 865 F.3d 1361, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). 
 24. Id. at 1365. 
 25. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
1278 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1273 
 
allegations of its original certified claim.  In its amended complaint 
before the Board, the claimant’s contract reformation counts alleged 
that the Corps had made a misrepresentation by not mentioning the 
dam’s condition in the lease and that Lee’s Ford Dock had relied on the 
continued functioning of the dam.26  The ASBCA determined Lee’s 
Ford Dock had not established these allegations.27  Relying largely on 
the lease condition that gave the Corps unfettered right to manipulate 
lake levels, the ASBCA also rejected the contract breach count that the 
Corps’s prolonged reduction in the lake’s elevation was unreasonable.28 
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Whereas agency lawyers typically advocate before the Boards,29 upon 
appeal to the Federal Circuit, Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers take 
over the representation.30  With new lawyers and the broader interest of the 
entire government at stake, the DOJ argued that neither the ASBCA nor 
the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the claimant’s appeal because the 
lease agreement itself was not a type of contract covered by the CDA.31 
Under 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a), the CDA only applies to agency contracts 
for “(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being; 
(2) the procurement of services; (3) the procurement of construction, 
alteration, repair, or maintenance of real property; or (4) the disposal 
of personal property.”  In this regard, the question before the Federal 
Circuit was whether the lease constituted a contract for “the disposal of 
personal property” under 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(4).32 
The Federal Circuit found it well settled that a lease interest, even of 
real property, is a type of personal property that is not itself real 
                                               
 26. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365–66.  Curiously, the ASBCA reached the merits 
of these claims—even though it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
factually similar superior knowledge claim—because mutual mistake was the only 
premise Lee’s Ford Dock had put to the contracting officer in its certified claim.  See 
41 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (only claims subject to a COFD may be appealed to the Boards). 
 27. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365. 
 28. Id. at 1366. 
 29. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 6101.5(a)(2) (2017).  “The Boards” is a term of art that 
practitioners use to refer to various Board of Contract Appeals (BCA), such as the 
Armed Services BCA, the Civilian BCA, and the U.S. Postal Service BCA. 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012).  The BCA hears appeals from a contracting officer’s 
decision or the contracting officer’s failure to make a decision.  48 C.F.R. 
§ 6101.2(a)(1)(i). 
 31. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1365. 
 32. Id. at 1367. 
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property.33  This left the question of whether the Corps “disposed” of 
the personal property through the lease to Lee’s Ford Dock.34  Relying 
on the observation that “to dispose of ” something carries a broad 
connotation and that Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions of “disposal” 
include “to direct or assign for a use” or to “bestow,” the court 
determined that with the lease, the Corps had disposed of a personal 
property right to the claimant to operate a marina on the premises.35 
While the court’s interpretation of § 7102(a)(4) is a fair enough 
reading of the provision, it is far from the only reasonable one.  Moreover, 
the court’s broad reading of “disposal of personal property” appears to be 
in direct tension with the notion that jurisdictional statutes that waive the 
federal government’s sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.36 
It would be just as natural to conclude that the “plain reading” of the 
statutory text is that the “disposal of personal property” refers simply 
to the sale of a good.  Indeed, the first definition of “disposal” in Black’s 
is “sale,” and the definition of “dispose of ” states that it is “[o]ften used 
in restricted sense of ‘sale’ only, or so restricted by context.”37  In the 
context of § 7102(a), it would make sense that “disposal” was intended 
to mean “sale,” as the other three provisions refer to situations in which 
the government is procuring rather than selling property or services.38 
In support of this plain reading the government argued that the 
legislative history indicated that § 7102(a)(4) was added to the CDA to 
cover surplus sales contracts conducted by the General Services 
Administration.39  In enacting the CDA, the Senate report stated that 
“[c]ontracts for the disposal of personal property are included within 
the coverage of the bill even though they are for the sale rather than 
the procurement of property.  These contracts are generally referred 
to as ‘surplus sales’ contracts.  The General Services Administration has 
cognizance over all such sales.”40 
In rejecting the government’s narrower reading of § 7102(a)(4), the 
Federal Circuit noted that the Senate report does not state that the 
section “is limited to surplus sales contracts.”41  But, if legislative history 
                                               
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)). 
 36. See e.g., Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 37. Disposal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (4th ed. 1951). 
 38. See 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 39. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367. 
 40. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 18 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5252. 
 41. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367. 
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is to be used at all, it seems to be a tall order to require as a condition 
of creditability that congressional pronouncements go beyond an 
explanation of what is intended and explicitly exclude what is not 
intended.  Here, the Senate report explicitly equated the term “disposal” 
to its typical meaning of “sales,” specifically referenced Government 
Services Administration’s control of all such sales, and noted that the 
provision that would be promulgated at § 7102(a)(4) continues a practice 
that “ha[d] worked well for many years.”42 
To be sure, the court was on solid ground in observing both that 
§ 7102(a)(4) is “broad enough to encompass” the lease presented in 
the case and that it is inappropriate to use legislative history to inject 
ambiguity into a statute where none exists.43  Rather than reinforcing 
each other, however, these observations seem to be akin to ships 
passing in the night.  That a statute is “broad enough to encompass” 
one party’s interpretation does not counsel for the adoption of that 
interpretation; rather, it suggests that the alternative interpretation, 
too, is reasonable and therefore potentially amenable to interpretative 
tools such as legislative history.44 
4. Importance of the case 
Whether the demise of legislative history in statutory interpretation is to 
be cheered or lamented is debatable.45  The court’s considered non-use of 
legislative history in the seemingly ripe circumstances of Lee’s Ford Dock calls 
into question the continued viability of the tool in the Federal Circuit. 
Ultimately, though the claimant won the jurisdictional battle over 
the breadth of contracts that § 7102(a)(4) covers, it lost the war 
concerning whether jurisdiction existed over the appeal of its claim 
under § 7103(a)(1), which requires contractor claims to be submitted 
to the contracting officer for a decision.  Citing Federal Circuit cases 
                                               
 42. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 18. 
 43. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1367–68 (citing Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 704 F.3d 949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 44. See Rosete v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 48 F.3d 514, 518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting 
that statutory text is ambiguous where it is “capable of two reasonable 
interpretations”). 
 45. See, for example, the extended exchange between Jonathan R. Siegel and 
John F. Manning regarding the constitutionality and wisdom of courts using legislative 
history as a tool of statutory interpretation.  Compare John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (arguing that a court should not 
attribute a committee’s declaration of intent to Congress as a whole), with Jonathan R. 
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 
(2000) (arguing the judicial use of legislative history is constitutional). 
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that had established that a claim denied in a COFD differs from the 
one argued on appeal when the appeal “present[s] a materially 
different factual or legal theory” of relief, the court had little trouble 
finding that Lee’s Ford Dock’s appellate claim injected a governmental 
awareness or knowledge component that was absent from the mutual 
mistake contention argued in the certified claim.46  For this reason, the 
Federal Circuit held that the ASBCA lacked jurisdiction over the 
marina’s reformation causes of action.47 
B. Garco Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army 
With Lee’s Ford Dock and Call Henry, Inc. v. United States,48 Garco 
Construction, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army49 forms a cautionary tale for 
government contractors in claims cases.  The Federal Circuit denied 
relief to the contractor, Garco Construction (“Garco”), despite Garco’s 
incurring hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional costs due to 
what may have been a change in the government’s site access policy 
and that at least constituted a stricter application of an existing policy.50 
1. Background 
For over twenty years, Garco had regularly performed construction 
services at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Montana, with 
a labor force that largely consisted of persons living in a nearby prison’s 
pre-release facility.51  Even though the base security procedures may 
have given the government the right to prohibit access to convicted 
felons throughout, no Garco employee had ever been denied access to 
a worksite on the base.52 
The 2006 contract at issue contained a provision that incorporated the 
convict labor clause at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 52.222-3, 
which generally allows contractors to employ convicts in work-release 
programs.53  The contract also required contractors to adhere to the base 
                                               
 46. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1368–69 (quoting K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United 
States, 778 F.3d 1000, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 47. Lee’s Ford Dock, 865 F.3d at 1370. 
 48. 855 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see infra Section I.E (summarizing the Federal 
Circuit’s Call Henry decision). 
 49. 856 F.3d 938 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (Mar. 19, 2018). 
 50. 856 F.3d at 941. 
 51. Id. at 940.  Although the claim concerned the ability to access the worksite of 
Garco’s subcontractor, James Talbott Construction, that nuance is not germane to the 
decision.  For ease of reference, this discussion simply refers to Garco. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 940 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-3 (2016)). 
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access policy that stated that contractor employees would be subject to a 
“wants and warrants check” in which “[u]nfavorable results will be 
scrutinized and eligibility will be determined on a case-by-case basis.”54 
Following an altercation at an on-base Garco jobsite involving a pre-
release facility worker, the base commander issued a restrictive 
interpretation of the base access policy.55  The commander’s 
memorandum interpreted the “wants and warrants check” to mean a 
general criminal “background check.”56  Thus, whereas the policy as 
written could be interpreted as limited only to persons sought by law 
enforcement authorities (i.e., those subject to “wants and warrants”), the 
memorandum explicitly brought those with criminal backgrounds (even 
if not subject to a warrant) within the ambit of the base access policy. 
The commander’s memorandum further interpreted the “scrutiny” 
of those in a prison pre-release program to require denial of base 
access.57  Two days after the commander issued the memorandum, 
Garco submitted a request for equitable adjustment, which was later 
converted into a certified claim that the Air Force’s contracting officer 
denied.58  This claim sought over $450,000 as compensation for the 
increased expense of fulfilling the contract under the memorandum.59 
In a series of decisions, the ASBCA equated the term “wants and warrants” 
with “background check” and found that the base access policy was a 
sovereign act.60  The ASBCA denied Garco any recovery.61  Garco’s appeal to 
the Federal Circuit principally challenged whether the commander’s 
memorandum on base access constituted a change in policy.62 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA in a split decision.63  The 
                                               
 54. 856 F.3d at 940 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. at 941. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 941–42. 
 62. Id. at 940.  Garco made a claim for damages and an acceleration claim.  Id.  
This latter claim would have given Garco more time to perform the contract, which 
may have mitigated the monetary impact the base access policy had on the contractor.  
As the underlying basis for the acceleration claim is the same as the claim for 
compensation, however, the acceleration claim, which the Garco Construction majority 
rejected in short order, id. at 945, will not be discussed separately here. 
 63. Id. at 940. 
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court was divided on the question of whether the sovereign acts 
doctrine is strictly an affirmative defense and thus an argument that 
can be waived by the parties or, instead, whether it has a sufficiently 
jurisdictional aspect that the adjudicative body must confront the issue 
regardless of when it was recognized.64  Additionally, and perhaps 
more significant from a practitioner’s viewpoint, the Federal Circuit 
accorded deference to the commander’s interpretation of the base 
access policy under the Auer v. Robbins 65 standard, which potentially 
grants agencies unprecedented discretion in applying their internal 
guidance in individual matters.66 
a. The sovereign acts split 
As a default principle, the United States, as a sovereign, is immune 
to lawsuits.  It is only in circumstances that Congress has explicitly 
waived sovereign immunity that the government may be sued.67  The 
CDA waives sovereign immunity for contractors’ lawsuits against their 
federal customers.68 
But the CDA is not the end of the sovereignty discussion.  The fact 
that the government acts as a contracting party does not mean that it 
has suspended its role as a sovereign.  The judicially created sovereign acts 
doctrine protects the government from liability for its “genuinely public 
and general” acts that render the contractors’ performance 
impracticable.69  The sovereign acts doctrine distinguishes the government 
from other contracting parties by insulating the government from the 
ordinary principle of contract law that states that an owner is liable when 
its act prevents the contractor from performing.70 
The Federal Circuit panel’s majority viewed the sovereign acts 
doctrine as a run-of-the-mill affirmative defense that may be waived,71 
and it was enough that the government waived sovereign immunity 
                                               
 64. Id. at 942, n.2. 
 65. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 66. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 943 (citing id. at 461); see infra Section I.B.2.b. 
 67. See United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (stating that a waiver of sovereign 
immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed”). 
 68. 41 U.S.C. § 7105 (e)(1)(A) (2012). 
 69. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 70. See id.  As applied here, if the commander’s memorandum is a generally 
applicable statement of base access that only incidentally fell on Garco’s contract, the 
second prong of the analysis would be reached—whether application of the new 
interpretation of the base access procedure rendered performance impractical or 
impossible.  See id. 
 71. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 942, n.2. 
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through the CDA.  Thus, because Garco had not challenged on appeal 
the ASBCA’s determination that the base access policy constituted a 
sovereign act, the majority deemed the issue waived.72 
In the dissent, although agreeing that the sovereign acts doctrine is 
an affirmative defense,73 Judge Evan Wallach nonetheless opined that 
the doctrine is so “grounded in the [g]overnment’s sovereign 
immunity” that “questions regarding the doctrine’s application cannot 
be waived.”74  In his view, Garco’s failure to appeal whether the base 
access policy was a sovereign act was not the end of the story; the court 
should have reached the second question of the sovereign acts 
analysis.75  In this context, the second question would have concerned 
whether the base could have achieved the aims of its security policy 
through less restrictive means, such as requiring Garco to hire a third-
party law enforcement authority to police the worksite.76 
However, because the majority did not reach the application of the full 
sovereign acts doctrine, the main sovereign acts takeaway from this case is 
that on appeal, a lower tribunal’s conclusion regarding a sovereign acts 
doctrine application may be waived and thus must be challenged. 
b. Auer deference 
Garco’s main contention on appeal was that the commander’s 
memorandum constituted a compensable change to the conditions of 
the contract.77  This issue required the court to determine whether the 
memorandum’s interpretation of the base access policy’s “wants and 
warrants” clause to mean “background check” was a change or merely 
a clarification of the policy.78 
On this question, the court considered the policy to be an agency 
regulation to be accorded Auer deference.  Under Auer, the court must 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation unless that 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” 
or there is “reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”79 
Contrary to Garco’s argument that the term “wants and warrants” is a 
                                               
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 946 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 951, n.5. 
 75. Id. at 947. 
 76. Id. at 946. 
 77. Id. at 942 (majority opinion). 
 78. Id. at 945. 
 79. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 462 (1997). 
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term of art that is much narrower than the commander’s interpretation, 
the court found the policy’s phrase to be ambiguous80 and susceptible to 
the broader connotation of “background check.”81  As a result, the court 
“conclude[d] that the [memorandum’s] interpretation is not plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and [the court] therefore 
must give it controlling weight.”82 
3. Importance of the case 
The wide berth the Federal Circuit gave the agency to broaden the 
number of workers it excluded from the base should be bracing for 
contractors and their counsel.  The base access policy that was 
interpreted by the commander’s memorandum was not a regulation 
that emerged from notice and comment rulemaking; it simply was local 
guidance that had been unevenly applied for decades.  It seems rather 
arbitrary for the Air Force to ratchet up base access restrictions without 
compensating Garco.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has declined to 
afford Auer deference when doing so “would seriously undermine the 
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of 
the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or requires.’”83 
Often government contract attorneys try to attach controlling 
meaning to agency “field memoranda,” “operational handbooks,” 
“interpretative letters,” and other guidance that is on par with the base 
access procedures here and argue that the agency should have to abide 
by them.  According controlling weight to even lower level 
“interpretative memorandums” and similar documents adds further 
elements of variability and risk to the government contractor’s task. 
On March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court denied Garco 
Construction’s petition for certiorari.84  Justice Clarence Thomas wrote 
a dissent, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined.85  Terming Garco 
Construction “an ideal case to reconsider [Auer] deference,”86 the dissent 
                                               
 80. Garco Constr., 856 F.3d at 943. 
 81. Id. at 942–43. 
 82. Id. at 945. 
 83. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012) (quoting 
Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 
(D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
 84. Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052 (2018) (denying certiorari without 
explanation). 
 85. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 1053.  Justice Thomas referred to the doctrine as “Seminole Rock deference” 
after the case that initially established judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
their own regulations, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
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viewed the doctrine as a “constitutionally suspect” accumulation of 
power in the executive branch because it allows the promulgating 
agency the unilateral power to change the regulation’s meaning 
without an effective judicial check.87 
Quoting his own observation that Auer deference is “on its last gasp,” 
Justice Thomas noted several recent instances in which the doctrine 
has been criticized by the Supreme Court.88  Whether and when this 
prognostication comes to pass, today Auer still commands five votes on 
the Supreme Court.89  Thus, “[w]hile the military is far better equipped 
than the courts to decide matters of tactics and security, it is no better 
equipped to read legal texts,”90 for now on Malmstrom Air Force Base, 
“wants and warrants” means much more than it says. 
C. Agility Defense & Government Services v. United States 
Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has observed that “if Iraq 
has shown us anything, it [is] the unpredictability of war.  Once a 
conflict starts, the statesmen lose control.”91  Like policy makers and 
military officials, government contracting officers must also deal with 
the unpredictable nature of war when they structure contracts and 
define requirements necessary to support combat operations and 
logistics.  A requirements-type contract is one flexible contract vehicle 
that can be used to accommodate unpredictable fluctuations in 
demand for a particular product or service. 
But when the government decides to use a requirements-type 
contract, it must provide potential offerors with a realistic estimate of 
the anticipated requirements that is based “on the most current 
information available.”92  In Agility Defense & Government Services v. 
United States,93 the Federal Circuit grappled with the question of how 
this obligation applies to requirements that are driven by the timing of 
troop movements in a warzone.94  The court held that the government 
could not rely on historical data to develop estimated quantities 
                                               
 87. Garco Constr., 138 S. Ct. at 1052. 
 88. Id. at 1053. 
 89. See Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 748, 763 
(1995) (interpreting Justice William Brennan’s well-known description of the Supreme 
Court as subject to the “rule of five” as meaning that “it takes five votes to do anything”). 
 90. Garco Constr., 138 S. Ct. at 1053. 
 91. Fred Kaplan, The Professional, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008 (Magazine), at MM40. 
 92. 48 C.F.R. § 16.503(a)(1) (2017). 
 93. 847 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 94. Id. at 1352. 
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because it possessed information that indicated there was likely to be a 
surge in requirements above historical levels.95   
1. Background 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides logistical support, 
supplies, and equipment disposition services to troops deployed all over 
the world.96  One component of the DLA, the Defense Reutilization 
Marketing Service (DRMS), is responsible for disposing of all excess 
personal property generated by the various military services.97  DRMS 
has established locations throughout the world where surplus property 
is received and processed for disposal or sold on the scrap market.98 
DRMS historically processed all surplus property at these locations 
for the military services.99  But in late 2006, the director of DRMS 
determined that the agency could not handle the expected workload 
created by planned troop movements.100  As a result, DRMS issued a 
solicitation in early 2007 for a first-of-its-kind contract to dispose of 
surplus property received at locations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Kuwait.101  The solicitation contemplated the award of a firm-fixed 
price requirements contract under which the contractor would be 
responsible for disposing of all surplus property received at six 
designated locations.102 
To offset some of the risk to the contractor, DRMS allowed the 
contractor to retain the proceeds of any surplus property that it could 
sell for scrap on the open market.103  The solicitation also included a 
special clause that the DRMS drafted and intended to address “significant 
workload increases or decreases.”104  Clause H.19 allowed the contractor 
to recover additional costs (1) if the workload increased at any location by 
                                               
 95. Id. at 1351. 
 96. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 677, 681 (2015), 
rev’d, 847 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1347. 
 100. Id.  Although it is unclear from the court’s opinion, it appears based on the 
timing of events that the decision by DRMS was likely influenced by troop movements 
planned to execute President George W. Bush’s order to send 20,000 troops to Iraq in 
what became known as “the surge.”  David E. Sanger, Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure 
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at A1. 
 101. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 680, 682. 
 102. Id. at 682. 
 103. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1348. 
 104. Id. 
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more than 150% above the average for the three preceding months, and 
(2) if the parties determined that the increase would continue for more 
than two months.105  Alternatively, if there were significant workload 
decreases at a particular location, DRMS had the right to renegotiate 
the price paid to the contractor to operate that location.106 
During the solicitation phase, one of the offerors asked DRMS to 
provide workload history and projections for each location.107  DRMS 
told offerors in an amendment to the solicitation that it did not have 
workload projections.108  Although DRMS would not provide workload 
estimates, it did inform offerors that it anticipated an increase in 
property “turn-ins.”109  In lieu of providing estimates, DRMS provided 
a link to a government website that contained historical data that 
showed the number of property items, as well as the scrap weight and 
scrap sales received for each location.110  The website also showed the 
number of personnel DRMS employed at each location.111 
A later amendment to the solicitation included a spreadsheet that 
showed the amount of scrap weight expected for all six locations 
during the base contract year and four one-year option periods.112  The 
spreadsheet detailed the expected amount of scrap by weight and 
category (e.g., scrap vehicle, fuels/oil, and electronics).113  The 
projected scrap quantities reflected a stable workload for the first two 
years followed by workload declines in the last three years.114 
After Agility won the contract and began performance in early 2008, it 
immediately inherited a workload that was substantially higher than the 
historical data suggested.115  During the first year of performance, Agility’s 
workload was well over double pre-contract levels, and it also inherited 
significant backlogs at all locations.116  Agility did not have sufficient staff 
to accomplish the work and eventually added over 100 personnel to 
perform the contract.117  When Agility attempted to recover funds spent 
                                               
 105. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 122 Fed. Cl. at 682. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1347. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1348 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 117. Id. at 685. 
2018] 2017 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS LAW DECISIONS 1289 
 
on the additional personnel, DRMS took the position that clause H.19 did 
not apply because the workload was high from the inception of the 
contract.118  Thus, according to DRMS, there was never a time when the 
increase was above 150% of the preceding three months.119 
After more than two years of performance issues, DRMS terminated 
Agility’s contract for convenience.120  Thereafter, Agility submitted two 
claims seeking an equitable adjustment of nearly $6 million for costs 
incurred to process surplus property in excess of the anticipated 
quantities.121  The contracting officer awarded Agility just $236,363.93 
and denied the remainder of the claims.122 
2. The Court of Federal Claims’s decision 
Agility filed suit in the COFC for the unpaid amounts and increased 
its overall claim to nearly $7 million.123  Agility’s complaint asserted three 
alternative theories of recovery: (1) DRMS constructively changed the 
contract; (2) DRMS provided negligent estimates during the solicitation 
phase; and (3) DRMS “breached the warranty of reasonable accuracy 
regarding the information provided during the [solicitation] phase.”124  
The COFC denied Agility’s claims on all three theories.125 
Agility’s constructive change claim was premised on DRMS’s alleged 
failure to disclose its superior knowledge about scrap estimates and 
troop movements prior to contract award.126  The COFC rejected this 
theory because there was no evidence that DRMS had knowledge of 
“specific planned troop movements.”127  Further, the COFC found that 
troop movements in a warzone were unpredictable and the 
government was not required “to be clairvoyant.”128  According to the 
COFC, it was reasonable for DRMS to provide historical data instead 
of estimates, and the government had no obligation to “search for or 
create additional information” to provide to offerors.129 
The COFC turned next to Agility’s negligent estimate claim that was 
                                               
 118. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., 847 F.3d at 1349. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2015). 
 124. Id. at 687. 
 125. Id. at 691. 
 126. Id. at 688. 
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similar to, but not co-extensive with, the constructive change claim.  To 
prove its negligent estimate claim, Agility had to show that government 
estimates were “inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good 
faith, or grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate 
was made.”130  When awarding a requirements contract, FAR 16.503 
provides that agencies “shall state a realistic estimated total quantity in 
the solicitation and resulting contract.”131  But the COFC found that 
“[w]hen the scope of a contract is extensive or complex, like the 
unpredictable demilitarization of vehicles, weapons[,] and other 
property in the Middle East, there may be ‘no central point to obtain 
accurate predictions of orders.’”132  As a result, the COFC rejected 
Agility’s negligent estimate claim and concluded that it was reasonable 
for DRMS to “provide[] objective, historical workload data from which 
the offerors could extrapolate future needs.”133 
Finally, the COFC denied Agility’s claim that DRMS breached “[t]he 
warranty of reasonable accuracy[, which] is a corollary to the concept 
of negligent estimate.”134  To prevail, Agility had to prove that it 
detrimentally relied on a material representation DRMS made as part 
of the solicitation.135  Because DRMS expressly declined to provide 
estimates in the solicitation, the COFC determined it could not have 
made a material representation regarding the expected workload.136  
As a result, the COFC found no breach of the warranty of reasonable 
accuracy by DRMS.137 
Fundamentally, the COFC viewed its task as “determin[ing] which 
party, Agility or the [g]overnment, assumed the risk that the costs of 
performance would be higher than anticipated.”138  The COFC 
observed that this was “an unusually high-risk contract” but concluded 
that Agility assumed that risk by agreeing to a fixed price contract while 
knowing that the inherent unpredictability of troop movements could 
increase requirements.139 
                                               
 130. Id. at 689 (quoting Medart, 967 F.2d at 581). 
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3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s decision.140  The 
court only reached Agility’s negligent estimate claim because the other 
two theories presented alternative bases for recovery.141  The court found 
that the COFC’s decision was erroneous for two primary reasons.142 
First, the court found that the COFC erred by ignoring that DRMS’s 
projection of scrap quantities was itself an estimate of projected 
requirements because the weight of scrap was expected to correlate 
with the number of property items turned in by the military services.143  
Because DRMS “project[ed] stable and then declining scrap weight,” 
the court found that it essentially provided offerors with an estimate 
that property turn-ins would “remain constant and then decline.”144  
According to the court, it was clear error for the COFC not to treat the 
scrap projection as an estimate.145 
Second, the court disagreed with the COFC’s conclusion that 
DRMS’s provision of historical data satisfied its requirement to provide 
a realistic estimate.146  The court held that the government cannot rely 
solely on historical data if it has other information that is reasonably 
available that can be used to establish a more realistic estimate.147  
Here, the court found that DRMS possessed information regarding its 
anticipated requirements that went above and beyond the historical 
data provided to offerors.148 
Specifically, a memorandum dated prior to contract award indicated 
that DRMS was aware of planned troop movements and that a surge of 
equipment and material was expected to be turned in as units 
departed.149  Because DRMS anticipated an increase in workload, the 
court found that DRMS’s decision to simply provide offerors with 
historical workload data was not “the most current information 
available” and did not provide a “realistic estimate” under FAR 16.503.150 
The court rejected DRMS’s argument that the parties’ agreement to 
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clause H.19 foreclosed Agility’s negligent estimate claim.151  In the 
court’s view, Agility’s claim did not involve the limited subject of clause 
H.19 but was instead “rooted in DRMS’s violation of FAR 16.503, 
leading to a large disparity between pre-contract estimates and actual 
workloads during the performance period.”152  The court also denied 
the government’s argument that Agility’s receipt of scrap sale proceeds 
should preclude its recovery.153  The court held that Agility was entitled 
to recover on its negligent estimate claim regardless of how much it 
was able to recover from scrap proceeds.154  The court reversed the 
COFC’s denial of Agility’s negligent estimate claim and remanded for 
calculation of Agility’s equitable adjustment.155 
4. Importance of the case 
The government often relies on historical data to predict future 
needs.  In Agility Defense, the Federal Circuit clarified that use of 
historical data does not satisfy the obligation to provide a “realistic 
estimate” under FAR 16.503 when better and more current information 
is available to forecast the agency’s anticipated requirements.156  This 
obligation applies even where, as in Agility Defense, the requirements at 
issue are driven by inherently unpredictable events such as troop 
movements.157  In the aftermath of the Federal Circuit’s decision, the 
government will be more vulnerable to potential negligent estimate 
claims when it chooses to rely on historical data to project future needs 
under a requirements-type contract. 
D. Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis 
In Agility Public Warehousing Co. KSCP v. Mattis158 (“Agility PWC ”), the 
Federal Circuit was again confronted with a contract plagued by the 
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 153. Id. at 1354. 
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unpredictability of war.  In Agility PWC, however, the government’s 
unanticipated actions during contract administration, rather than 
unreliable pre-award estimates, hampered the contractor’s performance.  
The Federal Circuit held that, although those unanticipated actions did 
not breach the express terms of the contract, they could still form the 
basis for a constructive change claim or a claim for breach of the 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.159 
1. Background 
In May 2003, the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, a sub-agency 
of the DLA, awarded a contract to Agility to provide food and non-food 
products to military customers in Kuwait and Qatar.160  The original 
contract pricing structure called for a “unit price” that would include 
a “delivered price” and a “distribution price.”161  The distribution price 
consisted of various administrative expenses as well as transportation 
costs from the vendor’s distribution facility to the final delivery 
point.162  This case involved a dispute concerning the transportation 
costs included in the distribution price component of the contract’s 
pricing structure. 
Shortly after award, the parties modified the contract to expand the 
service area to include the Iraq deployment zone.163  Modification 1 
(“Mod. 1”) stated that the supply trucks going to Iraq were to be 
escorted by the military and would not be used for storage purposes at 
the delivery sites.164  Modification 2 (“Mod. 2”) provided that Agility 
was entitled to charge the government additional fixed amounts per 
day for trips lasting longer than three days.165  The duration of each 
trip was to be calculated from the time the trucks were loaded until the 
trucks returned to Agility’s distribution facility in Kuwait.166  There was 
initially no limit on the maximum fees payable to Agility if trucks 
remained in Iraq for long periods.167 
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Once Agility began performance, its supply trucks experienced 
myriad delays on trips from Kuwait to forward operating bases in 
Iraq.168  Although the parties expected trips to last seven days at the 
time of contract award, the average turnaround time was fifteen days.169  
Because some bases lacked cold-storage equipment, soldiers often kept 
Agility’s refrigerated trucks onsite to store food.170  This resulted in 
numerous trips that greatly exceeded the fifteen-day average, 
including one trip that lasted 154 days at a cost of nearly $100,000.171 
The parties eventually engaged in a series of discussions about how 
to improve the turnaround time.172  Agility wanted its trucks back more 
quickly and the government was concerned about the amount of fees 
paid for lengthy trips under Mod. 2’s uncapped fee structure.173  Agility 
proposed to provide more support personnel throughout its 
distribution network in Iraq in exchange for higher fees.174  In return, 
the government proposed to place a twenty-nine-day cap on the 
transportation fees payable to Agility.175 
Agility expressed concern that the proposed cap was “unqualified” 
and could result in large losses if trucks were delayed by the 
government.176  Agility’s representative “stated that Agility would 
prefer to have the ability to submit exceptions to the [twenty-nine] day 
rule if the situation is unavoidable despite our best efforts to prevent 
it.”177  The contracting officer responded by email that “exceptions to 
the [twenty-nine-]day rule will only be considered in the form of a 
claim.”178 
Despite Agility’s reservations, the parties executed Modification 27 
(“Mod. 27”), which included the twenty-nine-day cap on fees.179  
Mod. 27 restructured the transportation fees owed to Agility.  The new 
fee structure included a minimum number of days and a minimum 
cost for trips based on the delivery location in Iraq.180  Agility was 
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entitled to daily fees for additional days beyond the minimum trip 
length, except the government would not pay any fees beyond the 
maximum twenty-nine-day cap.181  Mod. 27 further stated that 
“additional days beyond the established minimum fees are only 
applicable if the delay is customer caused.”182  A customer-caused delay was 
defined under Mod. 27 as a situation in which the military did not have 
“the capability to off load and return the truck” to Agility.183 
After the execution of Mod. 27, Agility began submitting claims for 
payment to cover trucks that were in Iraq longer than twenty-nine 
days.184  Agility claimed that the additional costs were recoverable 
because the military was holding trucks for storage in violation of the 
provision in Mod. 1, which stated that “trucks will not be used at the sites 
for storage purposes.”185  Agility eventually submitted a certified claim 
seeking approximately $12.5 million.186  The contracting officer denied 
the claim on the basis that Mod. 27 imposed a twenty-nine-day cap.187 
2. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals’s decision 
Agility appealed the contracting officer’s decision to the ASBCA.  
Agility argued that the government “(1) breached the express terms of 
the contract, (2) breached its promise to consider exceptions to Mod. 27’s 
[twenty-nine]-day cap on fees, (3) breached the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing, and (4) constructively changed the contract.”188  After a 
ten-day hearing, the ASBCA denied Agility’s appeal.189 
The ASBCA held that the new provisions included in Mod. 27 
modified the storage prohibition in Mod. 1. Specifically, the ASBCA 
found that Mod. 27 would have been “useless and inexplicable” if the 
government could not use the trucks as storage.190  Moreover, based on 
the exchanges between Agility and the contracting officer prior to 
Mod. 27, the ASBCA determined that Agility understood that the 
twenty-nine-day cap was “unqualified” such that it was accepting all 
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risks associated with delays beyond twenty-nine days.191  Having 
concluded that the government did not breach the express terms of 
the contract, the Board stated that there was no need to determine 
whether the government breached the implied duty of cooperation or 
constructively altered contract performance.192 
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the ASBCA’s interpretation of Mod. 27 
and its decision that the government did not breach the express terms 
of the contract.193  Like the ASBCA, the court found that the twenty-nine-
day cap was “unqualified” and therefore applied to all government-
caused delays, including storage delays.194  According to the court, 
“the language of Mod. 27 abrogated any remaining significance of Mod. 
1, Paragraph 4,” which prohibited the use of trucks for storage 
purposes.195  Based on the plain language of Mod. 27 and the supporting 
extrinsic evidence considered by the ASBCA, the court concluded that 
the parties intended to share “the risk of travel times rather than 
hav[e] the government shoulder the burden alone.”196  As a result, the 
court affirmed the ASBCA’s decision to deny Agility’s express breach 
of contract claim.197 
The court also affirmed the ASBCA’s denial of Agility’s claim that 
the government breached its promise to consider exceptions to the 
twenty-nine-day cap imposed under Mod. 27.198  The court recognized 
that “neither Agility nor the government ever added or insisted on 
language in Mod. 27 regarding exceptions to the [twenty-nine]-day 
cap.”199  Rather, Agility agreed to the unqualified twenty-nine-day cap 
included in Mod. 27, so its argument was based “entirely on a few lines in 
an email exchange” between Agility’s representative and the contracting 
officer.200  The exchange between Agility and the government, however, 
did nothing more than demonstrate that the government “merely agreed 
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 193. Id. at 1373, 1382. 
 194. Id. at 1380–81. 
 195. Id. at 1381. 
 196. Id. at 1382. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 1373, 1383. 
 199. Id. at 1382. 
 200. Id. 
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to consider any exceptions to the [twenty-nine]-day cap.”201  Because the 
government was not contractually obligated to make exceptions, the 
court affirmed the ASBCA’s denial of Agility’s claim.202 
Although the court agreed with the ASBCA’s analysis of the breach of 
contract claim, the court found that the ASBCA erred by failing to analyze 
Agility’s implied duty and constructive change claims.203  The implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to expand a party’s express 
contractual duty.204  But the court held that a “party might breach this 
implied duty by interfering with another party’s performance or acting in 
such a way as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party 
regarding the benefits provided by the contract.”205  Thus, even though 
the government abided by the express terms of the contract, the court 
explained that the government may have breached its implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by, for example, “unnecessarily delaying the 
return of Agility’s trucks and not increasing its on-site food storage 
capabilities.”206  The government could not impose a twenty-nine-day cap 
on fees but then “engage[] in conduct that made it impossible for Agility 
to perform within the cap.”207  The court vacated the ASBCA’s decision as 
to the implied duty claim and remanded the case to the ASBCA to decide 
that claim in the first instance.208 
The court also determined that the ASBCA erred by failing to 
consider Agility’s constructive change claim.209  To prove a constructive 
change claim, “a plaintiff must show (1) that it performed work beyond 
the contract requirements, and (2) that the additional work was ordered, 
expressly or impliedly, by the government.”210  Agility contended that the 
government constructively changed the contract by increasing the 
number of instances where trucks were held on site for storage 
purposes.211  According to the court, the ASBCA erred in not considering 
this contention because a contract change does not need to constitute 
                                               
 201. Id. at 1383. 
 202. Id. (finding that there was no error in the ASBCA’s judgment on the issue of 
exceptions). 
 203. Id. at 1385 (vacating the ASBCA’s decision on the implied duty claim). 
 204. Id. at 1384 (citing Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014)). 
 205. Id. (citing Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1385. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. (quoting Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 211. Id. 
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an express breach of contract.212  The court therefore instructed the 
ASBCA to also consider Agility’s constructive change claim on remand. 
4. Importance of the case 
Agility PWC solidified the Federal Circuit’s trend towards a more 
expansive view of implied duty claims.  The Federal Circuit’s 2014 
decision in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United States213 was the first case to 
give new life to contractor claims for breach of the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing.  In Metcalf, the court clarified that 
contractors do not need to show that the government “specifically 
targeted” benefits of the contract to prove an implied duty claim.214  
The court in Metcalf was also clear that “a breach of the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing does not require a violation of an express 
provision in the contract.”215  Agility PWC reaffirmed this principle.  In 
the wake of Metcalf and Agility PWC, implied duty claims will likely 
proliferate as contractors seek to recover increased costs of 
performance caused by government actions that frustrate their 
contractual rights or benefits. 
E. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States 
In contrast to the warzone contracts examined above, the contract 
at issue in Call Henry involved a run-of-the-mill domestic service 
contract governed by the Service Contract Act (SCA).  The contract 
included a standard SCA price adjustment clause that allowed the 
contractor to recover increased costs incurred to comply with the 
statute over the course of a multi-year contract.216  The price 
adjustment clause effectively shifted the risk of increasing compliance 
costs to the government.217  But in Call Henry, the court denied the 
contractor’s attempt to recover pension withdrawal liability costs under 
that provision in a decision that may have significant consequences for 
service contractors, their employees, and the government.218 
                                               
 212. Id. 
 213. 742 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 214. Id. at 992–93. 
 215. Id. at 994. 
 216. Id. at 1351. 
 217. Id. (explaining that the price adjustment clause is the mechanism for 
providing the price increase that the government is willing to pay when contractors 
incur increased compliance costs). 
 218. Id. at 1356 (affirming the COFC’s decision to dismiss Call Henry’s complaint 
for failure to state a claim). 
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1. Service Contract Act background 
The SCA addresses various employment issues that arise when a 
recompetition results in a new contractor taking over for an incumbent 
on a federal service contract, and the incumbent employees are 
“rebadged” to work for the successor contractor. 
For one, contracts covered by the SCA must include a “wage 
determination” that establishes the minimum wages and fringe 
benefits that must be paid to employees performing the work.219  
Employees covered under the SCA are entitled to wage rates and 
benefits that are equal to or greater than (1) the minimum wage under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act; (2) the prevailing wage rates established 
by the Department of Labor for the geographic area where the work 
will be performed; or (3) the rates set by a collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) entered into by the incumbent contractor.220  When 
an incumbent, or predecessor, contractor has entered into a CBA, the 
successor contractor must pay at least the same wages and fringe 
benefits specified in the CBA.221 
By requiring a successor contractor to pay at least the same wages 
and benefits as the predecessor contractor, the SCA protects 
employees from the effects of competition on government contracts.  
Without the so-called predecessor contractor rule, incumbent 
contractors who engaged in collective bargaining would be at high risk 
of being underbid on the successor contract by one who did not offer 
fair wages.222  This would frustrate “one of the [SCA’s] principal policy 
implications . . . that the U.S. government, as a customer, is willing to 
pay a premium for services in return for its contractor’s obligation to 
compensate service employees adequately and fairly.”223 
To effectuate this policy, the SCA price adjustment clause “provides a 
framework for increasing the unit labor rates in a service contract when 
certain events occur that increase the costs of complying with an 
                                               
 219. 41 U.S.C. §§ 6703(1), (2) (2012). 
 220. Id. §§ 6703, 6704. 
 221. Id. § 6707(c)(1); see also 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-41(f) (2017). 
 222. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1350. 
 223. Id. at 1351; see also S. REP. NO. 89-798, at 3–4 (1965) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 89-948, at 2–3 (1965) (explaining the need for this legislation as federal service 
contractors are “one of the most disadvantaged groups of our workers and little hope 
exists for an improvement of their position without some positive action to raise their 
wage levels . . . [and] [t]he Federal Government has added responsibility in this 
area”)). 
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increased wage determination.”224  For contracts that span multiple 
years, the price adjustment clause allows the contractor to obtain a price 
increase if it incurs additional costs to comply with a wage determination 
or applicable CBA in effect on the anniversary date of the contract or at 
the beginning of a renewal option period.225  Because the contractor is 
entitled to price increases, the price adjustment clause requires the 
contractor to warrant that its original contract price does not include 
any contingency to cover costs for which adjustment is provided.226 
In Lear Siegler Services, Inc. v. Rumsfeld,227 the Federal Circuit held that 
“the price adjustment clause is triggered by changes in an employer’s cost 
of compliance with the terms of a wage determination.”228  According to 
the court, the lack of a change in the level of benefits mandated by a 
CBA is irrelevant to a price adjustment clause inquiry.229  Thus, in Lear, 
the court concluded that the contractor was entitled to a price 
adjustment to cover the increased costs it incurred to comply with 
health benefits defined in the applicable CBA, even though there was 
no change in the level of benefits required under the CBA.230 
2. Background 
In April 2003, Call Henry, Inc., entered into a multi-year, SCA-
covered contract to provide inspection, maintenance, and testing 
services to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA).231  The contract included a three-year base period and seven 
one-year options.232  Call Henry’s employees were members of the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 416 (“the 
Teamsters”).233  Call Henry negotiated a CBA with the Teamsters that 
was effective from 2003 to 2007.234 
The CBA required Call Henry to join and contribute to the 
“Teamsters’ Pension Plan,” which was subject to the Multi-Employer 
Pension Plan Amendment Act (MPPAA).235  The MPPAA “requir[es] 
                                               
 224. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1351–52. 
 225. 48 C.F.R. § 52.222-43(d). 
 226. § 52.222-43(b). 
 227. 457 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 228. Id. at 1269. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1352. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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any employer who withdraws from the plan to pay withdrawal liability 
to the pension fund.”236  The withdrawal liability is used to fund the 
employer’s share of its pension plan’s obligations while it was 
associated with the plan.237 
When the base period of Call Henry’s contract expired in 2007, 
NASA executed the first option year.238  Call Henry’s “option contract 
was a successor contract to the three-year base performance period.”239  
As a consequence, the CBA effective from 2003 to 2007 became the 
“wage determination” applicable to the first option year.240  Call Henry 
entered into a new CBA applicable to the first option year and, as 
“NASA continued to exercise option contracts . . . [,] Call Henry 
continued to enter into new [CBAs] with the Teamsters.”241  During 
the option periods, Call Henry’s mandatory pension obligations 
increased, and it became more costly to fund the Teamsters’ Pension 
Plan under each successive CBA.242  As a result, at each renewal, NASA 
provided an upward price adjustment on the contract pursuant to the 
SCA to compensate Call Henry for its increased pension obligations.243 
In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decertified the 
Teamsters as the representative for Call Henry’s employees.244  The 
NLRB’s decertification order resulted in Call Henry’s “withdrawal” 
from the Teamsters’ Pension Plan.  This triggered Call Henry’s liability 
under the MPPAA.245  Although Call Henry was potentially liable for 
approximately $6 million in withdrawal liability, it was able to reduce 
that amount to less than $2 million through arbitration.246 
After the arbitration decision, Call Henry filed a certified claim to 
the NASA contracting officer seeking reimbursement for the assessed 
                                               
 236. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012). 
 237. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1352 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1381(b)(1) (2012); Connolly v. 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  When the government exercises an option, the contractor becomes a 
“successor” contractor to itself.  See 29 C.F.R. § 4.163(e) (2016) (stating that the SCA 
“is applicable by its terms to a successor contract without regard to whether the 
successor contractor was also the predecessor contractor”). 
 241. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1353. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. (noting that a new union, the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, replaced the Teamsters as the representative of the employees). 
 245. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a). 
 246. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1353. 
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MPPAA withdrawal liability under the SCA price adjustment clause.247  
In Call Henry’s view, the withdrawal liability was recoverable as an 
increased cost of providing pension benefits under its CBA with the 
Teamsters.248  But NASA’s contracting officer disagreed and denied the 
claim on the basis that “MPPAA withdrawal liability is not an increased 
cost of complying with the [CBAs], but a result of withdrawal from the 
pension fund.”249 
3. The Court of Federal Claims’s decision 
Call Henry filed a single-count complaint at the COFC alleging that 
NASA breached the contract by failing to adjust the contract price to 
offset the increased pension costs.250  NASA filed a motion to dismiss Call 
Henry’s claim on the grounds that NASA had no contractual obligation 
to provide an adjustment for Call Henry’s MPPAA withdrawal liability.251  
NASA argued that withdrawal liability is not a fringe benefit covered by 
the SCA but rather a distinct statutory liability under the MPPAA.252  The 
COFC granted NASA’s motion, relying on what the Federal Circuit 
later characterized as “two independent lines of reasoning.”253 
First, the COFC held that the SCA does not incorporate all of the 
terms of a CBA into the contract, only the wage and fringe benefit 
amounts.254  The COFC reasoned that Call Henry’s withdrawal liability 
was recoverable only if it constituted a “fringe benefit” covered by the 
SCA.255  Second, the COFC concluded that withdrawal liability is not a 
“fringe benefit” under the SCA because it is an independent benefit 
covered by a different statute—the MPPAA.256  Because withdrawal 
liability is a benefit that is required by another federal law, it could not 
also be a fringe benefit under the SCA.257  Further, the COFC noted 
that although the Teamsters’ CBA required Call Henry to contribute 
to the Pension Plan, it did not mention withdrawal liability.258  
                                               
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1353–54. 
 249. Id. at 1354. 
 250. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 282, 284 (2016), aff’d, 855 F.3d 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1354. 
 254. Call Henry, 125 Fed. Cl. at 286. 
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 257. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 4.171(c) (2016)). 
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Therefore, the COFC determined that Call Henry’s liability under the 
MPPAA is not a fringe benefit covered by the contract, and, as a result, 
NASA did not breach the contract by refusing to pay the withdrawal 
liability under the price adjustment clause.259 
4. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the COFC’s decision but, in doing so, 
effectively sidestepped the question of whether MPPAA withdrawal 
liability is a fringe benefit covered by the SCA.  The court noted that 
Call Henry, with the support from amicus curiae Professional Services 
Council, “devote[d] considerable attention” to that issue,260 yet the 
court determined that the issue was not dispositive in this case.261  The 
court concluded that Call Henry’s claim would fail even if the court 
“held that MPPAA withdrawal liability may, in some cases, be a cost of 
providing fringe benefits covered by the SCA.”262 
Under the court’s reasoning, Call Henry’s withdrawal liability was not 
a recoverable cost under the price adjustment clause because it did not 
result from complying with a wage determination applied to Call 
Henry’s NASA contract.263  The court distinguished Call Henry from Lear 
by explaining that the contractor in Lear was contractually bound to the 
agency to provide certain fringe benefits to its employees pursuant to 
the mandatory SCA provisions of the contract.264  Here, however, the 
court concluded that “Call Henry’s contract with NASA did not obligate 
Call Henry to pay MPPAA liability in the event of withdrawal.”265 
According to the court, “Call Henry independently assumed the risk 
of MPPAA withdrawal liability” because it chose to negotiate a CBA 
with the Teamsters that required it to join the Teamsters’ Pension 
Plan.266  The court was convinced that the price adjustment clause did 
not “allocate the risk of MPPAA liability to the government” under 
these circumstances because “NASA did not require Call Henry to 
negotiate with the Teamsters or join the Teamsters’ Pension Plan.”267  
Additionally, NASA had no contractual remedies against Call Henry if 
                                               
 259. Id. at 288. 
 260. Call Henry, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 1356. 
 266. Id. 
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Call Henry failed to meet its MPPAA withdrawal liability obligations.268  
For those reasons, the court affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of Call 
Henry’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 
5. Importance of the decision 
Although the Federal Circuit sidestepped the question of whether 
withdrawal liability is a “fringe benefit,” its reasoning nevertheless 
rejects the view that withdrawal liability is an integral part of the 
underlying pension benefit guaranteed under the CBA.269  Call Henry 
owed withdrawal liability for pension benefits that it should have been 
paying to the employees performing the contract if the Teamsters’ 
Pension Plan had done proper actuarial assessments.270  As a result, the 
withdrawal liability could be viewed as just a substitute for the pension 
benefits payable under the CBA and thus the SCA as a “fringe benefit.” 
But the Federal Circuit’s decision declined to recognize the 
interrelationship between withdrawal liability and the underlying SCA 
fringe benefit, emphasizing instead the absence of NASA’s contractual 
right to compel payment of the withdrawal liability.271  Given the 
significance of potential MPPAA withdrawal liability, Call Henry may 
cause service contractors to seriously reconsider whether they should 
enter into CBAs to fulfill their obligations under the SCA.272  This, in 
turn, could have undesirable effects on workers and the government’s 
efforts to promote fair and equal pay for workers. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL CASES 
The common denominator among the three 2017 cases discussed in 
this Section may explain, at least in part, how these cases reached the 
Federal Circuit.  In all of the three cases the parties did not stand in a 
typical owner-contractor posture, where pressures such as maintaining 
collegial business relationships and contractor positioning for favorable 
performance ratings can nudge the parties toward compromise and 
settlement.  One plaintiff was a Native American tribe that received 
                                               
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. at 1355 (noting that MPPAA withdrawal liability is not a cost of 
complying with wage determinations). 
 270. MPPAA withdrawal liability is based on the “amount of unfunded vested 
benefits allocable to the employer withdrawn from the plan” and that amount is 
determined using actuarial assumptions.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1393 (2012). 
 271. Call Henry, 855 F.3d at 1356. 
 272. See Daniel Abrahams & Andrew Crawford, Pension Withdrawal Liability—The 
SCA Trap, 59 GOV’T CONTRACTOR, May 2017, at 3. 
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statutory block grants from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD); another was a hospital group that complained 
about reimbursement rates under a federal health care program; and 
the third was a shareholder of a financial institution who believed that 
it got the short end of the stick when the government bailed out the 
institution during the 2008 financial crisis. 
As for their contributions to the legal canon, this year’s jurisdictional 
cases further elaborated on considerations that play into whether a 
statute is “money mandating” for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction 
and also on standing issues for third party claimants. 
A. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States 
In suits against the United States under the Tucker Act, jurisdiction 
cannot rest upon the Tucker Act alone because it does not create a 
substantive cause of action.273  Thus, a plaintiff must identify a separate 
source of money-mandating substantive law that creates a right to 
money damages in order to establish jurisdiction under the Tucker 
Act.274  In Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States,275 the 
Federal Circuit examined the question as to whether a reduction in 
future payments under a grant program that conditions the use of 
funds states a claim under a money-mandating statute.276 
1. Background 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Native American Housing Assistance 
and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA) with the goal of improving 
housing conditions and socioeconomic status for Indian tribes and their 
members so that they would be able to “take greater responsibility for 
their own economic condition.”277  The NAHASDA established an 
annual block grant system that allowed tribes to provide affordable 
housing to tribe members.278  Specifically, the statute required HUD to 
make grants according to a specific regulatory formula.279  The tribes 
were limited in how they could spend these funds, and failure to comply 
                                               
 273. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 
424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 
 274. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216–17; Testan, 424 U.S. at 398. 
 275. 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 276. Id. at 1315. 
 277. 25 U.S.C. § 4101(4) (2012). 
 278. Id.  § 4111(a)(1). 
 279. Id. § 4152(b)(1)–(3). 
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with statutory requirements allowed HUD to recapture funds.280 
The Lummi Tribe and three tribal housing entities (“the Tribes”) 
had qualified for and received NAHASDA block grants.281  In 2001, the 
HUD Inspector General determined that HUD had improperly 
allocated funds to the Tribes and provided an opportunity to dispute 
and appeal the findings.282  HUD ultimately recovered the funds 
erroneously paid by withholding amounts from grant allocations in 
subsequent years.283 
2. The Court of Federal Claims’s decision 
The Tribes sued in the COFC under the Tucker Act and the Indian 
Tucker Act.284  The suit alleged that HUD deprived the Tribes of funds 
to which they were entitled by misapplying the required formula and 
by denying the Tribes a hearing.285  The government moved to dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the NAHASDA block grant 
provision was not a money-mandating statute.286  The COFC denied 
this motion on grounds that the language “shall . . . make grants” and 
“shall allocate any amounts” in the statute bound HUD “to pay a 
qualifying tribe the amount to which it is entitled under the 
formula.”287  Accordingly, the COFC found the statute to be money 
mandating.288 
The Tribes had also argued that HUD’s alleged violations of the 
procedural requirements for hearing rendered the subsequent 
withholding of grant funds an illegal exaction.289  The COFC found 
that even if the agency erred by not affording the Tribes a hearing, the 
procedural violations could not support an illegal exaction claim.290  
The COFC explained that “nothing in the statutory framework . . . 
suggests that the remedy for failure to afford procedural rights is, 
                                               
 280. 25 U.S.C. §§ 4139, 4161(a)(1). 
 281. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1315. 
 282. Id. at 1315–16. 
 283. Id. at 1316. 
 284. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1505 (2012)). 
 285. Id. at 1316. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. (citing Lummi Tribe of Lummi Reservation v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 
584, 594 (2011)). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id.  This argument was made after the procedural claim was first dismissed by 
the COFC and the Tribes amended their complaint. 
 290. Id. at 1317. 
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without further proof of entitlement, the payment of money.”291  The 
government appealed the holding that NAHASDA was money 
mandating, and the Tribes appealed the lack of remedy for the 
procedural violation.292 
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit determined that the COFC erred in finding that 
the NAHASDA was a money-mandating statute.293  The Federal Circuit 
determined that “[a] statute is money mandating if either: (1) ‘it can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for . . . damages sustained’; or (2) ‘it grants the claimant 
a right to recover damages either expressly or by implication.’”294 
To reach its decision, the Federal Circuit analyzed its holding in 
National Center for Manufacturing Sciences v. United States.295  There, a 
statute had mandated that “not less than $40,000,000 of the funds 
appropriated in this paragraph shall be made available only for the 
[plaintiff]” by the Air Force.296  In that case, however, the Air Force had 
only released $24,125,000 in funding.297  The plaintiff in National Center 
brought suit in district court, citing Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) jurisdiction.298  The Air Force moved to dismiss, or in the 
alternative, to transfer to the COFC, contending that the case arose 
under the Tucker Act.299  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit on appeal 
found that a simple money judgment was not sufficient, that injunctive 
relief was required, and that the appropriation of funds was limited by 
statute for specific purposes.300  According to the Federal Circuit, this 
meant that the district court was not divested of authority to conduct 
an APA review because the “Tucker Act suit in the [COFC would] not 
                                               
 291. Id. (quoting Order at 5, Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United 
States, No. 08-848C (Fed. Cl. Sept. 30, 2015), ECF No. 121 (denying plaintiffs’ motion 
for summary judgment)). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. (quoting Blueport Co. v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed Cir. 
2008)). 
 295. 114 F.3d 196, 198 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 296. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1317 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Ctr., 114 
F.3d at 198). 
 297. Nat’l Ctr., 114 F.3d at 198. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 202. 
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serve as the ‘other adequate remedy in a court.’”301 
When the court applied National Center to the facts in Lummi Tribe, the 
result was a severe restriction on what remedies would be available to the 
Tribes.  In Lummi Tribe, although the Federal Circuit acknowledged that 
it had not expressly found in National Center that the COFC lacked 
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit nonetheless concluded that, under 
NAHASDA, the Tribes are not entitled to an actual payment of money 
damages in the strictest terms; their only alleged harm is having been 
allocated too little in grant funding.302  Thus, at best, the Tribes sought 
a nominally greater strings-attached disbursement, but any monies so 
disbursed could still be later reduced or clawed back.303  And, 
similar to the restrictions on the use of funds in National Center, “[t]he 
Tribes are even restricted with respect to the particular bidding and 
bond terms they may use for, say, housing construction contracts.”304 
The Federal Circuit, analogizing to the holding in National Center, 
refused to stretch the remedy of damages to cover highly regulated 
future grant disbursements.305  After describing the relief sought as 
equitable in nature, the Federal Circuit held that “[a]lthough the 
Tucker Act has been amended to permit the [COFC] to grant 
equitable relief ancillary to claims for monetary relief, there must be an 
underlying claim for actual presently due money damages from the 
United States.”306  The Federal Circuit then held that the Tribes’ 
underlying claim was not for presently due money damages but rather 
to force the payment of strings attached grants, which were not 
authorized by statute as a “free and clear transfer of money.”307  The 
Federal Circuit unanimously concluded that the NAHASDA was not 
money mandating.308 
Separately, the Federal Circuit quickly disposed of the Tribes’ illegal 
exaction claims on the basis that “[a]n illegal exaction claim must be 
based on property taken from the claimant, not property left unawarded 
                                               
 301. Id. 
 302. Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation v. United States, 870 F.3d 1313, 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 303. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 4161(a)(1) (2012)). 
 304. 870 F.3d at 1318 (citing 2 C.F.R. § 200.325 (2017); 24 C.F.R. § 1000.26 (2017)). 
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to the claimant.”309  Because the Tribes could not show that failure to 
disburse money that was never in their possession was an illegal 
exaction, the Federal Circuit also rejected this alternate theory of 
jurisdiction.310 
4. Importance of the case 
Lummi Tribe demonstrates that when seeking to invoke jurisdiction 
under the Tucker Act, the fact that money damages “may flow from a 
decision that [an agency] has erroneously interpreted or applied its 
regulation” is not enough to change the fundamental nature of a case 
seeking equitable relief into one for money damages.311  Claims for 
equitable relief must be ancillary to an underlying claim for actual 
presently due money damages.312  Further, where money may only be 
paid in the future and any payment is conditioned with restrictions on 
the way in which it may be used, the statute may not be said to be 
money mandating.313  Instead, these characteristics tend to reveal that 
the claim is equitable in nature—seeking to force the government to 
take action rather than to vindicate rights to legal damages for actions 
already taken.  Finally, while a legal exaction claim may provide a 
limited source of alternative jurisdiction under the Tucker Act,314 such 
a claim is not viable if it seeks property unawarded to the claimant 
rather than property taken from the claimant.315 
As a final note to Lummi Tribe, the Federal Circuit observed that the 
government had taken inconsistent positions with respect to whether 
the NAHASDA statute was money mandating.316  Specifically, in Modoc 
Lassen Indian Housing Authority v. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development,317 the government had argued to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that a district court’s decision ordering 
                                               
 309. Id. at 1319 (citing Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (stating the proposition that an illegal exaction involves money that was 
“improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant in contravention of the 
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation”)). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. (quoting Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 312. Id. 
 313. See id. at 1318–19. 
 314. See Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007–08 (Ct. Cl. 1967) 
(holding that persons can bring suit against the Government under the Act when the 
Government has the “citizen’s money in its pocket”). 
 315. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1319. 
 316. Id. at 1319–20. 
 317. 864 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2017). 
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HUD to return funds amounted to an award of money damages, which 
could only be pursued under the Tucker Act.318  In that case, the Tenth 
Circuit had agreed with the government.319  The Federal Circuit stated 
that “[o]f the government’s two faces, we find the one presented to the 
Claims Court—the one arguing that this is not a suit for Tucker Act 
damages—to be the correct one.”320 
B. Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States 
In Ingham Regional Medical Center v. United States,321 the Federal 
Circuit was again asked to review whether claimants had stated claims 
under a money-mandating statute in order to create Tucker Act 
jurisdiction.322  The arguments in the case centered on whether an 
agency’s discretionary interpretation of its statute could give rise to a 
money-mandating claim.323 
1. Background 
In 1956, Congress established a military health care system called 
TRICARE to provide health care to current and former military 
members and their dependents.324  Under the TRICARE program, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) contracts with outside health care 
providers to deliver health care to program recipients and reimburses 
the providers in accordance with guidelines established by DoD.325  
Prior to 2001, the TRICARE statute allowed, but did not require, DoD 
to use Medicare reimbursement rules when reimbursing providers.326  
But in 2001, Congress amended the statutory language to state that 
“[t]he amount to be paid to a provider of services . . . shall be 
determined . . . in accordance with the same reimbursement rules as 
apply to . . . [Medicare].”327 
                                               
 318. Lummi Tribe, 870 F.3d at 1319 (citing Modoc Lassen Indian Hous. Auth. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 864 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2017)). 
 319. Id. at 1320. 
 320. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 321. 874 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 322. Id.  The case never expressly mentions the Tucker Act, but in the COFC, the 
Tucker Act had been plead as the jurisdictional provision.  See Complaint ¶ 5, Ingham 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. United States, Case No. 13-821-MBH, Dkt#1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 21, 2013). 
 323. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347. 
 324. Id. at 1342–43. 
 325. Id. at 1343 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1073(a)(2) (2012) and 32 C.F.R. §§ 199.1 
(2008)). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1079(j)(2)). 
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In response to the statutory change, DoD instituted a formal 
rulemaking process.328  During the rulemaking process, DoD determined 
that Medicare was phasing in a new payment methodology for outpatient 
services and that DoD planned to follow the Medicare approach.  
However, because of the complexities of the Medicare transition process 
and the lack of TRICARE cost report data comparable to Medicare’s, it 
was not practicable for DoD to adopt the “Medicare Outpatient 
Prospective Payment System” for hospital outpatient services.329 
DoD issued its final rule in 2005, and that rule applied until 2009 
when a new TRICARE payment system for hospitals, similar to 
Medicare’s rules, was introduced.330  A group of hospitals that included 
Ingham Regional Medical Center complained that the Medicare rules 
were only intended for use with individual health care providers rather 
than institutions with large overhead costs.331 
In response to these complaints, DoD hired an outside consultant to 
study the accuracy of TRICARE payments.  The study concluded that 
DoD had underpaid hospitals for radiology services but that all other 
outpatient services had been correctly paid.332  DoD then published a 
notice allowing hospitals to request review of their payments for 
outpatient radiology services.333  The process outlined for requesting 
this review included a requirement for the hospitals to sign a “release 
and agreement to accept the discretionary adjusted payment by the 
hospital.”334  The hospitals requested the discretionary payments, and 
only some signed the release.335 
During the review process, some of the hospitals were represented 
by counsel and requested a copy of the DoD consultant’s study through 
the Freedom of Information Act.336  Upon receipt of the study, the 
hospitals determined that the study contained multiple errors and that 
                                               
 328. Id. at 1343–44. 
 329. Id. at 1343 (quoting the DoD’s 2002 Interim Final Rule implementing 
TRICARE program reforms, titled, TRICARE; Sub-Acute Care Program; Uniform 
Skilled Nursing Facility Benefit; Home Health Care Benefit; Adopting Medicare 
Payment Methods for Skilled Nursing Facilities and Home Health Care Providers, 67 
Fed. Reg. 40,597, 40,601 (June 13, 2002)). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 1343–44. 
 333. Id. at 1344. 
 334. Id. at 1345 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 1345–46. 
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all outpatient services had been underpaid.337 
2. The Court of Federal Claims’s decision 
The hospitals brought suit in the COFC alleging that they had been 
underpaid for all outpatient services.338  The COFC dismissed Ingham’s 
breach of contract claims on the ground that the claims were barred by 
the release and dismissed the other claims on the ground that they failed 
to state a money-mandating claim.339 
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit first addressed the argument that the release 
signed by Ingham barred its claim.340  The Court reversed the COFC’s 
determination that Ingham’s signed release was “sufficiently broad to 
bar all of plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims.”341  The Federal Circuit 
held that “[a]bsent special circumstances, ‘a general release bars claims 
based upon events occurring prior to the date of the release.’”342  But 
the Federal Circuit found that the government relied on the release in 
the very same contract it was accused of breaching.343  In such 
circumstances, the Federal Circuit held that a release cannot bar claims 
for breach of contract.344  The Federal Circuit found that Ingham 
alleged that DoD failed to follow the methodology for calculating 
payment adjustments in the contract and that DoD’s promise to use 
this methodology had been part of the consideration for the release.345  
The Federal Circuit concluded that DoD could not use the release to 
bar Ingham’s contract claims when DoD did not adhere to its own 
contractual obligations and found that “hold[ing] otherwise would 
allow an agency to flout its contractual commitments with impunity.”346 
Turning to the arguments that the COFC had improperly dismissed 
                                               
 337. Id. at 1346. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 1346–47. 
 340. Id. at 1346. 
 341. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 342. Id. (quoting Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id.; see also Link v. Dep’t of Treasury, 51 F.3d 1577, 1583–84 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(holding agency could not enforce an appeal waiver in a last-chance settlement 
agreement because the agency had failed to carry out its responsibilities under the 
agreement). 
 345. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347. 
 346. Id. at 1346. 
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the money-mandating claims for failure to state a claim, the Federal 
Circuit first determined that the statute was ambiguous and that 
Chevron deference applied.347  The hospitals argued that TRICARE was 
required to implement a payment system similar to Medicare 
reimbursement rules for hospitals, but that DoD erroneously used 
reimbursement rules intended for individual providers instead of 
hospitals.348  The Federal Circuit found that the TRICARE statute was 
“money-mandating in the sense that it directs the agency to determine 
payment amounts in accordance with the same reimbursement rules 
as Medicare to the extent practicable.”349  However, the Federal Circuit 
found that at the time of the statutory change to the TRICARE statute, 
the Medicare rules were also changing and that it was impractical for 
DoD to use them.350  The Federal Circuit also found that nothing in 
the TRICARE statute required DoD to use the previous Medicare 
reimbursement approach and that Congress did not prescribe the 
rules that must be used if the Medicare approach was impractical.351  
Because it found DoD’s approach reasonable, the Federal Circuit held 
that the hospitals could not state a money-mandating claim.352 
The hospitals attempted to argue that DoD’s notice allowing for 
discretionary adjustments had admitted that DoD did not abide by the 
statute.353  But the Federal Circuit found that “DoD’s offer of 
discretionary payment adjustments does not mean it lacked the 
authority to implement the [reimbursement] rules.”354  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that both the actions of adopting the initial payment 
rules and offering discretionary payment adjustments had been within 
DoD’s discretion under the TRICARE statute.355  Because DoD was not 
required to implement any specific reimbursement rules and the 
approach adopted by DoD was reasonable, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the COFC’s dismissal of the money-mandating claims.356 
                                               
 347. Id. at 1347 (deferring to DoD’s construction of the statute); see also Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding courts 
must defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if congressional intent is ambiguous 
or nonexistent and the agency’s construction of the statute is a permissible one). 
 348. Ingham, 874 F.3d at 1347. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1347–48. 
 352. Id. at 1348. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1079(j)(2) (2012)). 
 356. Id. 
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4. Importance of the case 
Ingham illustrates two important jurisdictional points.  First, in the 
Federal Circuit, a release cannot be used to bar claims of breach of the 
same contract containing the release.  Second, with respect to whether 
a statute is money-mandating, claims based upon a disagreement with 
agency interpretation of the statute will not support a claim where, 
under Chevron, the agency has discretion in its interpretation of the 
statute, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. 
C. Starr International Co. v. United States 
During the 2008 financial crisis, American International Group, Inc. 
(AIG) was “too big to fail,” as its collapse would have posed a risk to 
the financial stability of the entire country.357  Apparently, a lawsuit by 
AIG’s largest shareholder, Starr International Co., which sough over 
$20 billion in compensation for alleged government improprieties 
with respect to AIG’s stock post-bailout,358 was “too big to settle.” 
In Starr International Co. v. United States,359 the Federal Circuit examined 
standing requirements for claims that were derivative of a third party’s 
rights.360  The claims in the case concerned a shareholder suit alleging 
illegal dilution of value and voting interests as a result of the government’s 
takeover of AIG in the wake of the 2007 housing market collapse.361  
Although the Federal Circuit applied Delaware law, it first announced the 
federal standard and then explained that it was applying Delaware law 
because it was consistent with federal law and did not frustrate it.362 
1. Background 
AIG is a publicly traded corporation that was caught up in the 2007 
collapse of the housing market.363  Facing mounting stresses on its 
liquidity, on September 12, 2008, AIG informed the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (FRBNY) that it needed between $13 billion and $18 billion 
to cover its urgent liquidity needs.364  By the morning of September 15, 
                                               
 357. See Renae Merle, AIG Is No Longer “Too Big to Fail,” Regulators Say, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/29/ 
aig-is-no-longer-too-big-to-fail-regulators-say. 
 358. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 359. 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 360. Id. at 958. 
 361. Id. at 957. 
 362. Id. at 966. 
 363. Id. at 958. 
 364. Id. 
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these needs had ballooned to over $75 billion, and another major 
financial institution, Lehman Brothers, had also filed for bankruptcy.365 
Realizing that the failure of AIG could destabilize the economy, on 
September 16, 2008, the FRBNY invoked the Federal Reserve Act to 
make an $85 billion loan to AIG with interest and fees in exchange for 
79.9% of AIG’s equity.366  That same day, all but one of AIG’s directors 
voted to accept the loan notwithstanding the unfavorable terms, 
viewing it as better than bankruptcy.367  On September 22, 2008, AIG 
entered into the formal agreement by which the federal government 
acquired the 79.9% equity interest in the form of preferred stock that 
was convertible to common stock.368 
At the time of the loan, AIG’s stock was at times dipping below $5.00 
per share, and the New York Stock Exchange had a minimum share-
price requirement of $1.00 per share.369  Failure to meet this minimum 
would result in delisting of the stock.370  By early 2009, AIG’s stock was 
falling below this threshold and AIG was at risk of being delisted.371  On 
June 30, 2009, AIG held a shareholder meeting where it proposed two 
amendments designed to alter the pool of AIG common stock and allow 
AIG to raise capital and raise the stock prices.372  The first of these 
amendments—a large increase (nearly double) in the amount of 
authorized common stock—failed to pass.373  The second amendment—
a reverse stock split—passed, and Starr International Co. (“Starr”) voted 
in favor of the amendment.374  This helped AIG avoid delisting, but it 
also made available enough shares of common stock that the 
government was able to convert its shares.375  The government 
subsequently sold its shares between 2011 and 2012 for a gain of $17.6 
billion.376  AIG repaid the $85 billion loan, plus approximately $6.7 
billion in interest and fees.377 
                                               
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 958–59.  FRBNY loaned AIG the $85 billion by invoking section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act.  Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
 367. Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 959. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. at 959–60. 
 373. Id. at 960. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
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2. The Court of Federal Claims’s decision 
Starr filed suit in the COFC asserting claims on behalf of itself and 
similarly situated shareholders.378  Starr alleged that the government’s 
initial acquisition of the 79.9% equity interest was an illegal exaction 
and an illegal taking.379  Starr also alleged that the stock split had been 
engineered by the government to avoid a shareholder vote, decrease 
the number of issued shares, and dilute the interests of AIG.380  The 
government moved to dismiss Starr’s claims for lack of standing, but 
the COFC allowed the claims to proceed to trial without resolving the 
motion.381  Ultimately, the COFC found that the government’s 
acquisition of AIG was an illegal exaction but granted Starr no 
monetary relief.382  Starr and the government filed cross appeals.383 
3. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Starr appealed the denial of monetary relief, while the government 
argued that Starr lacked standing because its claims belonged to AIG 
and the acquisition was not an illegal exaction.384  The Federal Circuit 
first addressed whether Starr had standing to pursue its claims 
directly.385  The Federal Circuit explained that “[f]or a party to have 
standing, it must satisfy constitutional requirements and also 
demonstrate that it is not raising a third party’s legal rights.”386  The Federal 
Circuit assumed that Starr satisfied the constitutional requirements:  (1) an 
actual or imminent injury in fact that is concrete and particularized, (2) a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and 
(3) likely redressability by a favorable decision.387 
Turning to whether Starr was asserting a third party’s rights, Starr 
argued that it satisfied the standing principle because the government’s 
acquisition harmed its personal economic and voting interests 
independent of any harm to AIG.388  The Federal Circuit first explained 
that both federal and Delaware law were relevant to the question as to 
                                               
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. at 960–61. 
 380. Id. at 961. 
 381. Id. at 957. 
 382. Id. at 962. 
 383. Id. at 963. 
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 964 (citing Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004)). 
 387. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
 388. Id. at 965. 
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whether Starr had direct standing.389  Under federal law, the Federal 
Circuit found that shareholders are generally prohibited “from 
initiating actions to enforce the rights of [a] corporation unless the 
corporation’s management has refused to pursue the same action for 
reasons other than good-faith business judgment.”390  Under federal 
law only “shareholder[s] with a direct, personal interest in a cause of 
action, rather than injuries [that] are entirely derivative of their 
ownership interests in a corporation, can bring actions directly.”391 
The Federal Circuit explained that 
[u]nder Delaware law, whether a shareholder’s claim is derivative or 
direct depends on the answers to two questions:  “(1) who suffered the 
alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); 
and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy 
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”392 
In Delaware, a claim need not be based on a shareholder injury that 
is separate and distinct from that suffered by other stockholders to be 
direct.  Instead, a claim may be direct if “all stockholders are equally 
affected.”393  The Federal Circuit discussed the presumption that state 
law should be incorporated into federal common law unless doing so 
would frustrate the specific objectives of federal programs.  This 
presumption was “particularly strong in areas in which private parties 
have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights 
and obligations would be governed by state-law standards.”394  The 
Federal Circuit found that Delaware law was consistent with federal law 
and so found Delaware law applicable to Starr’s claims.395 
Turning to Starr’s claims, the Federal Circuit found that under Delaware 
law, “claims of corporate overpayment are treated as causing harm solely 
to the corporation and, thus, are regarded as derivative.”396  Starr’s claims 
were found to be dependent on an injury to the corporation—any dilution 
in value of a corporation’s stock reduces the value of each share equally, 
and the remedy usually goes to the corporation to restore the shares’ 
                                               
 389. Id. at 965–66.  The Federal Circuit noted that AIG was incorporated in Delaware. 
 390. Id. at 966 (alteration in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan 
Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990)). 
 391. Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 493 U.S. at 336–37). 
 392. Id. (quoting Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 
(Del. 2004) (en banc)). 
 393. Id. (quoting Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1038–39). 
 394. Id. (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991)). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 966–67 (quoting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91, 99 (Del. 2006)). 
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value.397  Therefore, the Federal Circuit explained that in order to pursue 
such claims, some other provision of Delaware or federal law must give 
Starr a direct cause of action to proceed.398 
To provide context to its discussion, the Federal Circuit first 
observed that Starr did not distinguish between its various equity 
claims for standing purposes and instead characterized them as 
alleging “the wrongful expropriation of [its] economic and voting 
interests in AIG for the [g]overnment’s own corresponding benefit.”399  
As the burden of demonstrating standing belonged to Starr, the 
Federal Circuit examined standing based on this theory of harm.400  
The Federal Circuit also discussed that Starr argued that its case for 
standing was particularly compelling because the government’s 
acquisition of AIG was equivalent to a physical exaction where the 
government engaged in a “physical seizure of four out of every five 
shares of [shareholders’] stock.”401 
The Federal Circuit declined to adopt Starr’s view of the acquisition, 
noting a difference between issuance of new stock, which results in equal 
dilution for all shareholders, and transfer of existing stock, which creates 
an individual relationship between the parties to the transfer.402  The 
Federal Circuit noted that adopting Starr’s position would largely 
presuppose the search for a direct and individual injury.403 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the merits of Starr’s standing 
argument.404  Starr argued that its claims fell within a “dual-nature” 
exception in Delaware law that recognized claims that were both 
derivative and direct in nature.405  Claimants must meet two criteria in 
order for this exception to apply: 
(1) a stockholder having majority or effective control causes the 
corporation to issue “excessive” shares of its stock in exchange for 
assets of the controlling stockholder that have a lesser value, and 
(2) the exchange causes an increase in the percentage of the 
outstanding shares owned by the controlling stockholder, and a 
corresponding decrease in the share percentage owned by the 
                                               
 397. Id. at 967. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. (alteration in original). 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. (alteration in original). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 968. 
 405. Id. 
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public (minority) shareholders.406 
Starr argued that government controlled the acquisition because of 
its disparate leverage in the negotiation.407  But the Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument because the dual-nature exception stemmed 
from a concern about fiduciary misconduct at the expense of minority 
shareholders.408  The Federal Circuit found that Delaware law 
consistently held that, while control did not require a party to be a pre-
existing majority stockholder, it did require a fiduciary relationship.409  
The Federal Circuit found that outside parties with leverage do not 
necessarily have any obligation to protect the interests of the 
counterparty, and even less so with respect to constituents of the 
counterparty.410  And the Federal Circuit further found that Starr had 
not shown any fiduciary relationship or that the government had 
actually exercised any direction over AIG’s conduct.411  Accordingly, 
the Federal Circuit found the dual-nature exception inapplicable.412 
Starr next argued that the Supreme Court recognized standing in a case 
similar to Starr’s, Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co.413  But the Federal Circuit 
found the Alleghany case distinguishable on grounds that the dispute was 
between shareholders and the corporation, and so there was not an issue 
as to whether the claim belonged to the shareholders derivatively.414  In 
contrast to the shareholders in Alleghany, Starr’s interests were aligned with 
AIG, not adverse to it.415  For this reason, third party standing was not at 
issue in Alleghany, and the case did not help Starr.416 
Starr then argued that the government nullified its voting rights that 
would have allowed it to block the government’s ability to obtain 
preferred stock.417  But the Federal Circuit found that Starr had waived 
this argument, and, in any event, Starr had not demonstrated a 
fiduciary relationship as would have been required under the only case 
                                               
 406. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 
91, 100 (Del. 2006)). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. at 969. 
 411. Id. at 969–70. 
 412. Id. at 969. 
 413. 353 U.S. 151 (1957); Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 970. 
 414. Starr Int’l Co., 856 F.3d at 970. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 970–71. 
 417. Id. at 971. 
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it cited in support.418 
Next, Starr argued that the Fifth Amendment provided an independent 
basis for standing because it created a special relationship between AIG’s 
shareholders and the government.419  The Federal Circuit rejected this 
argument, finding that “Starr does not cite any support for its submission 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause creates a [g]overnment 
‘duty.’”420  Further, “[e]ven if such a duty were to exist, Starr has not 
demonstrated why that duty would flow directly to a corporation’s 
shareholders rather than the corporation in the context of an equity 
transaction that affects all preexisting shareholders collaterally.”421 
Finally, Starr argued that it had standing because AIG’s shareholders 
were the “direct target of an illegal act.”422  The Federal Circuit found 
this argument “untethered to reality.”423  While it acknowledged that 
there was some testimony purportedly showing that the government 
wanted to punish AIG shareholders, the Federal Circuit pointed out 
that the COFC never actually reached this conclusion.424 
Because Starr did not demonstrate standing, the Federal Circuit did 
not address the merits of its equity claims.425  Turning to Starr’s 
remaining direct claims related to the conversion of preferred to 
common stock, the Federal Circuit found the COFC did not clearly err 
when it found that the primary purpose of the stock split was to avoid 
delisting, not to exchange the government’s shares.426  Judge Evan 
Wallach filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the 
result, however, stating that he would have examined jurisdictional 
claims first under the Tucker Act and would have determined that the 
Federal Reserve Act was not money-mandating.427 
4. Importance of the case 
This case showcases that standing issues can present difficult 
obstacles to third-party claims.  Federal law generally requires a direct 
                                               
 418. Id. at 971–72 (distinguishing Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 
769, 777 (Del. Ch. 1967)). 
 419. Id. at 972. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. (citing Golden Pac. Bancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1073 & n.14 
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 422. Id. (alteration in original). 
 423. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 424. Id. at 973. 
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 427. Id. at 975–76. 
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injury and prohibits derivative claims.428  State law will only apply where 
it does not frustrate federal law, and so it is unlikely in most instances 
that this rule would change under an application of state law in federal 
court.  For instance, here the Federal Circuit applied Delaware law 
because it found it to be consistent with federal law.429  Ultimately, 
when claims depend on an injury to someone else, they will not satisfy 
standing requirements. 
III. BID PROTEST CASES 
Bid protests account for the other two merits decisions handed down 
by the Federal Circuit in 2017.  Different barriers tend to weed out 
these cases before the Federal Circuit becomes involved.  First and 
foremost, absent an injunction pending the outcome on the merits in 
the COFC or a stay of the judgment pending appeals taken by 
contractors, the agency very likely will proceed to award and allow the 
awarded contractor to perform.  Faced with what may be the hollow 
victory of winning a legal point on appeal, but being left with little 
remedy because the contract will have been largely performed by the 
time the Federal Circuit rules, many protesters will drop the case. 
A. Diaz v. United States 
1. Background 
In Diaz v. United States,430 appellant Kevin Diaz submitted an “unsolicited 
proposal” to the U.S. Department of the Navy’s Indian Head Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal Technology Division under FAR 15.6.431  The 
contracting officer who reviewed the proposal found that it did not meet 
the FAR 15.606-1 requirements and rejected the proposal.432  Mr. Diaz 
filed a complaint in the COFC challenging that rejection, but the case was 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Diaz lacked 
standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2012).433  Mr. Diaz appealed.434 
                                               
 428. Id. at 966 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S. 
331, 336 (1990)). 
 429. Id. 
 430. 853 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 431. Id. at 1357. 
 432. Id. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. 
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2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit reviewed de novo the COFC decision to dismiss 
the case for lack of jurisdiction.435  First, it addressed the COFC’s subject 
matter jurisdiction.436  Section 1491(b)(1) grants subject matter 
jurisdiction for any “violation of a statute or regulation in connection 
with a procurement or proposed procurement” and is intended to be 
“very sweeping in scope.”437  Here, because Mr. Diaz had received a 
significant number of emails from government personnel regarding his 
proposal, the court found that his proposal qualified as a “proposed 
procurement.”438  Therefore, Mr. Diaz’s allegation that the contracting 
officer had improperly rejected his unsolicited proposal was found to be 
a non-frivolous allegation of a violation of a regulation in connection 
with a proposed procurement.439 
Second, the court addressed Mr. Diaz’s standing to file a bid protest.440  
Under § 1491(b)(1), a party must show that it is both an “interested 
party”441 and that it was “prejudiced by a significant error in the 
procurement process.”442  Under the interested party prong, a party 
must prove (1) that it is an actual or prospective bidder and (2) that it 
has a direct economic interest in the proposed procurement.443  The 
court noted that it had not established a standard for evaluating whether 
a party has a direct economic interest in an unsolicited proposal, but it 
approved of and adopted the COFC’s application of the “substantial 
chance” standard.444  The court therefore examined whether Mr. Diaz 
would have had a substantial chance of winning a contract which the 
government had never solicited.445 
To have a substantial chance of winning the contract based on an 
unsolicited proposal, a party must conform with the requirements of 
                                               
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. (quoting RAMCOR Servs. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1286, 1289 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 438. Id. at 1358. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. (quoting Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 442. Id. (quoting Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009)). 
 443. Id. (citing Digitalis Educ. Sols., Inc. v. United States, 664 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012)). 
 444. Id. at 1358–59. 
 445. Id. 
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FAR 15.6.446  In order to be a “valid unsolicited proposal” under FAR 
15.603, the proposal must 
(1) [b]e innovative and unique; 
(2) [b]e independently originated and developed by the offeror; 
(3) [b]e prepared without Government supervision, endorsement, 
direction, or direct Government involvement; 
(4) [i]nclude sufficient detail to permit a determination that 
Government support could be worthwhile and the proposed work 
could benefit the agency’s research and development or other 
mission responsibilities; 
(5) [n]ot be an advance proposal for a known agency requirement 
that can be acquired by competitive methods; and 
(6) [n]ot address a previously published agency requirement.447 
The contracting officer determined that Mr. Diaz’s proposal did not 
meet the first and fourth elements and was therefore not a valid proposal.448  
Mr. Diaz was unable to overcome this determination on appeal.449  The 
court held that Mr. Diaz failed to satisfy his burden to establish interested 
party status and that he did not have standing.450  Based on this finding, the 
court did not address the requisite showing of prejudice.451 
3. Importance of the case 
The case addressed the novel issue of the appropriate standard for 
determining the factors of a direct economic interest in the submission 
of an unsolicited proposal.  The court adopted the post-award standard 
whereby a plaintiff must show a “substantial chance of winning the 
contract,” even though the government did not solicit any proposals.452 
B. Dellew Corp. v. United States 
1. Background 
In Dellew Corp. v. United States,453 the U.S. Department of the Army 
awarded a contract to Tech Systems, Inc. (“TSI”) for logistics support 
                                               
 446. Id. at 1358. 
 447. Id. at 1359 (quoting 48 C.F.R. § 15.603 (2017)). 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 1360 n.3. 
 452. Id. at 1358–59. 
 453. 855 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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services in Hawaii.454  Dellew filed a post-award bid protest in the 
COFC, alleging that the award to TSI was improper because “(1) TSI 
did not accept a material term of the request for proposals when it 
refused to cap its general and administrative rate, (2) the contract 
awarded varied materially from TSI’s proposal,” and (3) the “Army had 
failed to perform an adequate cost realism analysis before awarding 
the contract to TSI.”455 
During oral argument on the cross-motions for judgment on the 
administrative record, the COFC announced that it intended to rule 
in Dellew’s favor on the merits.456  The court repeatedly made clear its 
view that corrective action would be appropriate, and it encouraged 
the Army to reconsider its award decision in order to avoid the issuance 
of a “needless ruling.”457 
The court required the parties to provide a joint status report within 
ten days of the hearing.458  In the joint status report, the Army 
announced that it had determined that changed conditions required 
an amendment to the solicitation.459  It terminated the contract with 
TSI and filed a motion to dismiss Dellew’s protest as moot.460 
The COFC granted the motion to dismiss the action and declined 
Dellew’s invitation to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
support of a finding that Dellew was the prevailing party.461  In the COFC’s 
view, given the dismissal of the protest, such findings and conclusions 
would amount to an advisory opinion, which is prohibited by the Case or 
Controversy Clause of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.462 
Nonetheless, Dellew sought attorney fees and costs under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d)(1)(A).463  In its 
EAJA ruling, the COFC awarded Dellew nearly $80,000 in fees and 
costs, holding that its comments during oral argument “carried a 
                                               
 454. Id. at 1377. 
 455. Id. at 1377–78. 
 456. Id. at 1378; Dellew Corp. v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 85, 89 (2016), rev’d, 855 
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 457. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1378. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id.; Dellew Corp. v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 429, 433 n.2 (2015); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 463. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(d)(1)(A) (2012)); Dellew Corp. v. United States, 
127 Fed. Cl. 85, 87 (2016), rev’d, 855 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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sufficient judicial imprimatur to materially alter the relationship 
between [Dellew] and [the government] such that [Dellew] qualifies 
as a prevailing party under the EAJA.”464  The court listed four reasons 
why Dellew was a prevailing party:  (1) the court had expressed its 
intention to rule in Dellew’s favor at oral argument, (2) it had clearly 
stated its view that the Army should take corrective action, (3) the 
Army’s corrective action was not voluntary, and (4) the court’s 
comment occurred after the parties had briefed the issues and the 
court had prepared a written decision.465  The government appealed.466 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the COFC’s finding that Dellew qualified 
as a prevailing party de novo.467  Under the EAJA, “a court shall award to 
a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . 
incurred by that party in any civil action . . . bought by or against the 
United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United 
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 
award unjust.”468  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party 
is one that obtains a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties.”469  A prevailing party does not include a party who obtained relief 
through “a defendant’s voluntary change in conduct.”470 
The Federal Circuit held that Dellew was not a prevailing party for 
three reasons.  First, the government took corrective action before the 
COFC issued either an oral or written ruling on the merits.471  The 
government’s actions were therefore voluntary.472  Second, the COFC’s 
expression of intent to rule in Dellew’s favor did not carry a sufficient 
judicial imprimatur to materially change the relationship of the parties 
because it was not equivalent to a “court-ordered change.”473  The 
COFC explicitly postponed ruling until after receipt of the joint status 
report and permitted additional briefing, indicating that it was 
                                               
 464. Dellew Corp., 127 Fed. Cl. at 89. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1377. 
 467. Id. at 1379. 
 468. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 469. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. 
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 470. Id. at 605. 
 471. Dellew Corp., 855 F.3d at 1380. 
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offering the government an opportunity to take corrective action but 
not requiring it to do so.474  Third, the COFC improperly relied on its 
ruling in a prior case, Universal Fidelity LP v. United States,475 where the 
court had found the protester to be the “prevailing party” after the 
court had issued an injunctive order in the plaintiff’s favor.476 
The Federal Circuit instead found the COFC should have examined 
relevant Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law such as Rice 
Services., Ltd. v. United States477 and Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United 
States.478  For these reasons, the Federal Circuit reversed the COFC’s 
order awarding attorney fees and costs to Dellew. 
3. Importance of the case 
This case establishes that a party is not a prevailing party for purposes 
of an award of costs/fees under the EAJA when an agency takes 
corrective action at the suggestion of the court rather than by order of 
the court.  This holding creates a bright line rule in which one may not 
rightly be deemed to be a “prevailing party” for EAJA purposes absent 
a written court order requiring the agency to take a certain action.479 
There is evident tension embedded in the Federal Circuit’s holding.  
Although whether one is a “prevailing party” under the EAJA is a 
question of law, the vantage point of the trial court is vastly superior to 
the Federal Circuit’s in the factual context presented.  The COFC 
judge knew far better than the Federal Circuit panel what was meant 
by what was said in the hearing on the cross-motions.480 
In this regard, the practical effect of Dellew may be limited and is 
                                               
 474. Id. 
 475. 70 Fed. Cl. 310, 315–16 (2006) (ruling that the protestor was the “prevailing 
party” within the meaning of the EAJA because the defendant-government’s action in 
curing deficiencies in the solicitation bid was court ordered and not voluntary, and 
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limitable by COFC judges.  In similar circumstances, the COFC judge 
simply can enter a bare bones “minute order” that directs the government 
to stay performance and to take other appropriate corrective actions that 
answer the court’s concerns as stated on the record.  This will be sufficient 
under Dellew’s interpretation of the EAJA’s “prevailing party” requirement 
to support the award of fees and costs to the protester. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2017, the Federal Circuit spun some cautionary tales for federal 
contractors who were forced to absorb revenues that were much lower 
or costs that were much higher than anticipated at the time of 
contracting.  To name a few, a would-be marina operator ended up 
leasing “mud front” property for years (Lee’s Ford Dock), a long-time 
local construction firm’s workforce was newly barred from the jobsite 
(Garco), and a service contractor got left holding the bag on a huge 
pension liability (Call Henry).  While contracting with the federal 
government certainly can be lucrative for contractors, it is not without 
traps for the unwary or unlucky. 
